Because Phase One is not interested in creating wholesale changes to their entire company, distracting from the industrial sectors that they now focus on and develop for, in order to have a shot, and not necessarily a good shot, at making a go in the very competitive under $8k - $10k digital capture segment. The IQ5 is not a savior for the company, it is a partial injection of sales that is relatively easy for them to do as the primary R&D around that sensor will be absorbed already by the industrial division. And it will be there for those who want it. They will not make an $8,000 smaller sensor digital back product, and I think it is the right choice for them not to. All in my humble opinion.
Somehow, there seem to be many who think that changing your entire company direction to a product line 1/5th the price, which would need to sell at volumes many times more, is a simple, doable thing, and surely an opportunity for success. It is not simple, and success would not be assured. There's tremendous risk. One may argue that a $50,000 IQ5 is not assured of success, and you would be correct, but they risk/lose nothing by delivering it, while the risk is very high going in the other direction. The industrial markets are their present and future, and as long as they keep making products for the consumer side, for those who desire them (they are still there in small numbers) and those who can afford them (they are still there in smaller numbers), be glad availability continues.
Steve Hendrix/CI
Steve Hendrix/CI
I respectfully, fundamentally disagree with this view.
DJI-Hasselblad represents a living, breathing example of what's actually possible when you break free from "it can't be done" thinking—precisely the mindset that has Phase One trapped in strategic paralysis which was driven by the short-term profit orientation of the PE investors and some false bets (i.e. bet on XT and old PRO price points instead of mirrorless successor, etc. or bet on SaaS for C1 when attacking LR customers).
Consider the hard numbers: DJI just reported $272M in revenue from their Hasselblad business, generating roughly $40M profit with $25M in R&D investment. This topline has doubled twice from their ~$70M base in 2022. Remember, Hasselblad started this journey in the late 2010s with $50K H6D-100c systems, and now they're systematically demolishing Phase One in the photography space.
The math reveals their strategic brilliance: assuming a conservative 1:3 lens-to-body ratio with wholesale pricing around $6,800 for bodies/backs and $4,250 for lenses, they're moving approximately 40K lenses and 14-15K bodies annually while maintaining healthy margins. With their R&D homework largely complete on the X2D MK II platform, they're positioned to hit $70M+ profit on an even higher revenue base—likely exceeding $300M by 2025.
But here's what makes DJI truly formidable: they're not just winning in photography. Their expanding B2B footprint in industrial drones and mapping solutions means they're competing with Phase One on multiple fronts simultaneously, marrying in the same company a modern prosumer go-to-market with perfect social media execution and cutting-edge industrial solutions. Go look at their new Gaussian Splatting 3D mapping drones. Incredible stuff.
This proves there's absolutely a viable middle ground where Phase One could offer both crop sensor solutions alongside their flagship 250 MPX systems, maintaining B2B leadership while building a compelling mirrorless successor to the XF. It demands investment and courage, but DJI's successful pivot counters any argument that it's impossible.
The critical insight is "prosumer"—call it luxury amateur if you prefer—because the traditional PRO market is fundamentally dead. The economics have shifted: fewer photographers can justify business depreciation on Phase One gear, and brick-and-mortar "advisory heavy" pro stores are becoming less relevant as sales channels as there are ample long-form youtube reviews that answer all questions on new equipment before ordering from the convenience of your desktop at home. That's different from "demoing" a 50k P1 kit in 2009 to see for yourself how great the IQ is.
Yes, they saw that too (a bit), which is why their "Premium Imaging" BU is called "Bespoke Photography", but the price point is too high to make it long-term growing rather than declining against alternatives like Hassy. We've seen the ads of some 50y old former doctors and entrepreneurs who sold their businesses and dabble in P1 gear to shoot a Safari to show to their friends. But the problem is that the quality delta vis a vis Fuji and Hassy is not high enough anymore to make this strategy fly to the tune of the price/performance ratio they dialled in. Also Chinese marketplaces are full of used P1 gear with IQ4 hitting the 15k USD mark down there despite a list price of what 45k?
Phase sells what - 150 XT third-party purchased and assembled (Rodie + Cambo) lenses per year while Hassy is pumping out 40k self-produced lenses- I know who's winning here.
The other critical insight is that mirrorless with AF is the key rather than tech cam focus. I bet the ratio of digital backs vs. X2D is higher than 1:5 (not for CI, but say B&H) with most prosumers just wanting a nice travel camera to shoot family, friends and landscapes with and NOT a tripod based system. And the XC - without AF and EVF not really useful. Its more a bragging right thing on Chinese social media rather than a serious camera system with good sales. The Petapixel review essentially was not really favorable ...
Hasselblad grasped this reality and adapted their go-to-market accordingly: B&H, direct web sales, volume-oriented distribution, move on from traditional PRO distribution (while still keeping the PRO store channel open). In Zurich, where I live last week the 30y long-standing CI equivalent closed doors forever - they just liquidated last stock last week. I doubt the golden age of pro photo stores is coming back - the future is prosumer, youtube reviews and online orders circumventing brick and mortar.
Re Hassy: Who would have predicted that the company synonymous with massive mirror-based H-series cameras would exceed a quarter-billion in crop medium format sales just a few years after almost going bankrupt after having been saved by a DJI? That's not just growth—that's complete strategic reinvention with a modern, low cost supply chain.
Phase One's fundamental problem isn't technical capability; it's organizational DNA. They remain an industrial company first, with photography as a secondary consideration. This creates a customer experience that's emotionally sterile—you wire $13K and receive an industrial lens in basic packaging, no communication, no relationship building. Compare this to Leica's prosumer-focused approach: free sensor replacements, complimentary repairs, genuine customer care that builds brand loyalty. I had a P1 sales rep in Southern Germany at one point - he would send me smalls things like lens wraps etc. for free. He got fired. In some Leica stores you get a coffee and look at a gallery on top.
The tilt lens debacle perfectly illustrates Phase One's tone-deaf customer relations: demanding $7-8K for tilt upgrades from customers who already paid $11K+ for lenses, despite the list price delta being only $1-2K between tilt and non-tilt versions. This kind of treatment kills prosumer adoption before it starts.
DJI proves you can successfully operate in both industrial and consumer markets simultaneously, but it requires fundamentally different cultural approaches within the same organization. Phase One needs to decide now whether to follow Hasselblad's playbook, but I fear their private equity timeline may not accommodate the patience required for this transformation. Their investors need an exit strategy, but they're constrained by declining photography revenues, stagnating Capture One growth, and tariff-impacted B2B performance.
The window for strategic pivot on the photo side is closing rapidly, but the DJI-Hasselblad model provides a clear roadmap for what's possible when industrial excellence meets consumer market sophistication. The alternative of just selling industrial goods to prosumers will result in further declining sales at these ultra high price points as Hassy penetrates more and more the space. The failure of this strategy can be seen also in secondary market prices. XT lenses are difficult to sell, and even new condition stuff trades at 50% or below retail.
It remains to be seen if the new leadership can do this. The choice to select a machine vision specialist as CEO indicates that the investors still want to firstly execute on a B2B strategy; this said, DJI's turnaround here is remarkable and a show of the new world-class companies China has produced and it should be studied very closely by the board of P1 what Hassy-DJI did here. Really remarkable to hit a quarter of billion of camera sales from near-bankruptcy. The reality in today's world is that China has reached parity or superiority in some tech areas, e.g. EV batteries, robotics and with DJI they have their own world-class camera company now. Built on know-how from their acquisition, but amalgamated and catalyzed by an incredible 9-9-6 work ethic (9AM to 9PM six days a week, look it up) DJI can out-R&D P1 now on lower dollar-cost basis and as a result we now have a 10-stop IBIS MF camera shipped and fully tariffed in the US market for USD 7'400 which already shows that you need to really roll-up your sleeve to compete or face potentially even lower sales down the road as people already now are selling P1 kits to move to X2Ds.
Now is a unique moment in time for P1 to recalibrate the prosumer strategy, or at least to find a sort of middle ground compared to the past between the ultra high price point and Hassy's successful strategy as I do believe that P1 can still command a modest premium for their backs compared to Hassy. Winning against this competition will require a tremendous effort culturally, and operationally but I do think it is possible as P1 still has a powerful brand in the photography world.
Let's see.