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Phase One Announces Leadership Transition - New CEO and Chairman

jduncan

Active member
Hasselblad was the first to close off its new HX camera bodies around 2010. Phase introduced the XF in2015. Around 2017, Phase introduced the IQ4 series of backs and decided that Hasselblad had a good idea when it closed off the H bodies so it reciprocated by closing off the IQ4 backs to H mount bodies. The intent was to try to force photographers who wanted a body to buy an XF. Tit for tat. (I speak from personal experience that the strategy failed miserably in my case, as I was planning to buy a IQ150 for my H2, but there was no way I was willing to purchase an XF.) Just like Phase’s ongoing refusal to open up Capture One.
The medium format digital market that Phase once dominated has undergone a sea change since the introduction of the X series and GFX integrated digital cameras. The once poor relative Hasselblad that was on life support and owned by PE firms is now earning tens of millions of dolllars and is owned by a strategic owner that has highly sophisticated technology and R&D capabilities in the digital imaging space.

Hi,

Hasselblad did not want to exclude the Phase One back; they asked Phase One to help with the sustained development of the camera, basically, to pay a licensing fee. It was fair, and the years P1 took to match the H are a good indication that Hasselblad was right.

Clearly, after that negative response, Hasselblad closed the platform in order to survive. It was not the only thing Phase One did; you may recall the Tilt and Shift Adapter debacle.

By trying to get a free ride from Hasselblad, Phase One effectively destroyed the MF market and hurt its own bottom line. Two competing cameras in a market where cameras do not produce money but backs do, such nonsense.

Then they tried to destroy the mirrorless MF market, the facto blocking themselves from entering the profitable small-sensor market and giving it all to Fuji.
Again, another destructive temper tantrum.

But that is water under the bridge. History is good to remember so we can understand and avoid making the same short-sighted mistakes, but today is another day, and we should hope the new CEO helps Phase move forward.

Best regards,
 

dougpeterson

Workshop Member
Hi,

Hasselblad did not want to exclude the Phase One back; they asked Phase One to help with the sustained development of the camera, basically, to pay a licensing fee. It was fair, and the years P1 took to match the H are a good indication that Hasselblad was right.

Clearly, after that negative response, Hasselblad closed the platform in order to survive. It was not the only thing Phase One did; you may recall the Tilt and Shift Adapter debacle.

By trying to get a free ride from Hasselblad, Phase One effectively destroyed the MF market and hurt its own bottom line. Two competing cameras in a market where cameras do not produce money but backs do, such nonsense.

Then they tried to destroy the mirrorless MF market, the facto blocking themselves from entering the profitable small-sensor market and giving it all to Fuji.
Again, another destructive temper tantrum.

But that is water under the bridge. History is good to remember so we can understand and avoid making the same short-sighted mistakes, but today is another day, and we should hope the new CEO helps Phase move forward.

Best regards,
This is a very very biased retelling of history. I assume this is the version as told to you by a Hasselblad employee.

I think it’s fair to say the (very different) version of the story I know (as told by various P1 employees) is also quite biased.

Presumably the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
 

ThdeDude

Well-known member
The IQ4-150 was announced (August 2018) when the iPhone X was then still the current iPhone (however, new iPhones were introduced in September). On Tuesday, we will see the announced of the iPhone 17 line. The pro line is expected to have three 48MP sensors. Perhaps we will see also two-layer sensors, supposedly, noticeably improving contrast range.

By all metrics, there has been a huge jump in photographic capability between the iPhone X and iPhone 17 Pro. Almost like day and night.

Not sure what I want to say here!
 

SrMphoto

Well-known member
This is a very very biased retelling of history. I assume this is the version as told to you by a Hasselblad employee.

I think it’s fair to say the (very different) version of the story I know (as told by various P1 employees) is also quite biased.

Presumably the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
Can we agree on the reason why there is no Hasselblad support in C1? Is it Hasselblad preventing C1 or is it C1 declining adding Hasselblad cameras and lenses support?
 

TechTalk

Well-known member
For some ancient (in digital years) historical perspective on how the medium format market has evolved, I am linking to one of the earliest posts I ever wrote in a photo forum. It is from October 29, 2007. It was during the time period when Hasselblad had announced their new strategy of focusing future product development on integrated systems in which the lens, camera, digital capture device, and software worked together seamlessly as a single unit. I was all for this approach because of the struggles I had had with getting earlier systems to work together reliably using a combination of products from different manufacturers, the "open system" approach. It created a firestorm of controversy and I was willing to step into it and make my own viewpoint known. Just in case some may find it of interest, I have also copied and pasted that 2007 post below...

The post below is a copy of one (linked above) which I wrote for the Luminous Landscape forum on October 29, 2007:

I understand the emotional attachment that people have to the tools that they use to create art. Whether the endeavor is considered commercial illustration or fine-art, the tools are part of the creative process and to some degree become an extension of the artist. I also, therefore, understand when emotions affect our attitudes about the direction that we would like to see companies, that make those tools, take and our desires for the tools we'd like to see them produce. There are, unfortunately, some cold hard financial and business realities at work in the medium-format photography market that are simply unavoidable and just starting to be fully realized.

First, there is no longer any profit to be made selling medium-format SLR cameras to the public. There is no balance or combination of volume and price that will make them profitable to sell for any company. The simple notions that a company can either reduce prices to increase volume or raise prices to increase profit do not work for this market. The factors limiting demand and volume for medium-format cameras are not directly related to the cameras themselves. The primary factor limiting medium-format camera demand is the high cost of digital backs compared to 35mm digital SLRs.

There was a healthy medium-format camera market when film was king. In the past, the cost of a medium-format camera was thousands of dollars higher than 35mm, but the cost of using one (film and processing) was comparable. As demand for digital cameras replaced demand for film cameras, the cost for a medium-format camera was still thousands of dollars higher, but the cost of using one for digital capture added tens of thousands of dollars to the cost! Demand plummeted for medium-format and once healthy manufacturers went out of business and they all lost money at a rapid rate. This is where we are today. Hasselblad, Mamiya and Rollei are left standing in the medium-format SLR market. All have been through severe financial problems and have been sold, merged or reorganized multiple times.

If there is no longer any profit in making medium-format cameras, how will the remaining market be sustained? The answer is that the cameras left will have to be subsidized and supported by the sale of digital backs. Medium-format cameras and backs have reached a symbiotic financial and market relationship. The reality is, medium-format camera manufacturing can only be sustained by the sale of the digital backs that are connected to them–not electronically, but financially. The other half of this financial/market mutual reliance is that digital backs need cameras to connect to, in order to have a purpose and survive.

The real-world proof, of all of this, is the past and present market. Those medium-format SLR makes and models that did not also have the sale of digital backs as a source of income are gone. Those remaining are all tied financially to digital back sales of their own make or in the case of the Hy6/AFi to others. Hasselblad has already indicated that they have little or no interest in the business of selling cameras that are not mated to their digital backs. The Sinar/Rollei/Leaf Hy6/AFi would not exist without the financial support of R&D, sales, marketing and service that are provided by Jenoptik and Leaf. The maker, Franke & Heidecke, no longer has the financial resources and has positioned themselves as a contract manufacturer. Mamiya has had very severe financial losses and it remains to be seen if their late entry into the digital back/camera market can return them to a healthy financial state. The plans of Mamiya's new owner, Cosmos Scientific Systems, Inc., remain unknown. I've left out Pentax, as they are missing-in-action in the medium-format digital business and are in the process of being absorbed by Hoya.

Given the financial reality as it exists now, I would anticipate that in the future medium-format cameras will follow the trend of camera and back being designed, marketed and sold as integrated units. There is simply no financial justification to make a money losing product, unless it supports income from a profitable one.

The business of selling digital backs has not always been profitable either. You may be surprised to discover that Phase One has operated at a loss in many of the past years. The current CEO was appointed in 2001 and given the task of turning the company around. The group of banks and venture capital firms that owned Phase One wanted to groom the company to take public or sell. In 2002, Phase One diversified by becoming a software company with Capture One for Canon, Nikon and many other cameras. After years of losses, in 2003 Phase One turned a small profit. 2004 was considerably better and by 2005, the owners were actively trying to find a buyer when they could show three straight years of profit. No buyer was found and in 2006 the company was sold to four current Phase One managers (75% share) and a danish venture capital firm (25% share).

The problem facing Phase One is not their current financial position, but future direction. As a software company they are going to be hit hard in market share by Adobe and Apple. DxO will take another slice.

In digital backs, Phase One is not providing any financial incentive for a camera maker to provide them with a platform. If I have made anything clear with this lengthy post, I hope it is the business necessity that is now emerging for medium-format camera manufacture to be financially supported by the sale of digital backs. Being offended by this fact, will unfortunately not change it. You can expect that Phase One is now actively searching for a camera to be tied to not just electronically, but financially as well–for their own future prosperity. The days of medium-format cameras and digital backs that are connected electronically, but not financially, is rapidly coming to a close–not because any of these companies are uncaring, evil or have bad intentions, but to survive into the future.
 
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rmueller

Well-known member
For some ancient (in digital years) historical perspective on how the medium format market has evolved, I am linking to one of the earliest posts I ever wrote in a photo forum. It is from October 29, 2007. It was during the time period when Hasselblad had announced their new strategy of focusing future product development on integrated systems in which the lens, camera, digital capture device, and software worked together seamlessly as a single unit.
Photokina, October 2008 was my entry into digital and I wanted to start MF directly and not make the same mistake as with 35mm.

So, I went to photokina in Cologne to check the various options:
  • Rollei Hy6/Sinar: The guys at the stand couldn't get the damn camera working and into my hands for some test shots. Returned later that day, same thing, not working.

  • Mamiya/Phase One: Had to turn on back and camera separately, the Mamiya body felt kind of cheap, the back left a good impression but as a system it felt odd, not integrated and with different haptics.

  • Hasselblad: They had the H3DII-31 and H3DII-39 and an offer whereas when you buy a second lens you pay half of the price of the second lens. The system felt good in the hand, robust, well manufactured and thought through. I decided for the H3DII-31 with 80 mm lens and the 28 HCD which cost me only half the price. Total kit was 16000 EUR (H3DII-39 would have been about 5000 EUR more which was not in my budget).
I never understood why Hasselblad should keep their body "open", why on earth would someone do that, it's an integration night mare in the digital world and only benefits your competitor.

Concerning Phase One, good luck really. Thing is, if your digital back for photography is seen as a side product of your industrial products, then the "photography DNA" of your staff is slowly vanishing and you risk releasing something no photographer asked for in the first place.

Regards,
Ralf
 
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hcubell

Well-known member
For some ancient (in digital years) historical perspective on how the medium format market has evolved, I am linking to one of the earliest posts I ever wrote in a photo forum. It is from October 29, 2007. It was during the time period when Hasselblad had announced their new strategy of focusing future product development on integrated systems in which the lens, camera, digital capture device, and software worked together seamlessly as a single unit. I was all for this approach because of the struggles I had had with getting earlier systems to work together reliably using a combination of products from different manufacturers, the "open system" approach. It created a firestorm of controversy and I was willing to step into it and make my own viewpoint known. Just in case some may find it of interest, I have also copied and pasted that 2007 post below...

The post below is a copy of one (linked above) which I wrote for the Luminous Landscape forum on October 29, 2007:

I understand the emotional attachment that people have to the tools that they use to create art. Whether the endeavor is considered commercial illustration or fine-art, the tools are part of the creative process and to some degree become an extension of the artist. I also, therefore, understand when emotions affect our attitudes about the direction that we would like to see companies, that make those tools, take and our desires for the tools we'd like to see them produce. There are, unfortunately, some cold hard financial and business realities at work in the medium-format photography market that are simply unavoidable and just starting to be fully realized.

First, there is no longer any profit to be made selling medium-format SLR cameras to the public. There is no balance or combination of volume and price that will make them profitable to sell for any company. The simple notions that a company can either reduce prices to increase volume or raise prices to increase profit do not work for this market. The factors limiting demand and volume for medium-format cameras are not directly related to the cameras themselves. The primary factor limiting medium-format camera demand is the high cost of digital backs compared to 35mm digital SLRs.

There was a healthy medium-format camera market when film was king. In the past, the cost of a medium-format camera was thousands of dollars higher than 35mm, but the cost of using one (film and processing) was comparable. As demand for digital cameras replaced demand for film cameras, the cost for a medium-format camera was still thousands of dollars higher, but the cost of using one for digital capture added tens of thousands of dollars to the cost! Demand plummeted for medium-format and once healthy manufacturers went out of business and they all lost money at a rapid rate. This is where we are today. Hasselblad, Mamiya and Rollei are left standing in the medium-format SLR market. All have been through severe financial problems and have been sold, merged or reorganized multiple times.

If there is no longer any profit in making medium-format cameras, how will the remaining market be sustained? The answer is that the cameras left will have to be subsidized and supported by the sale of digital backs. Medium-format cameras and backs have reached a symbiotic financial and market relationship. The reality is, medium-format camera manufacturing can only be sustained by the sale of the digital backs that are connected to them–not electronically, but financially. The other half of this financial/market mutual reliance is that digital backs need cameras to connect to, in order to have a purpose and survive.

The real-world proof, of all of this, is the past and present market. Those medium-format SLR makes and models that did not also have the sale of digital backs as a source of income are gone. Those remaining are all tied financially to digital back sales of their own make or in the case of the Hy6/AFi to others. Hasselblad has already indicated that they have little or no interest in the business of selling cameras that are not mated to their digital backs. The Sinar/Rollei/Leaf Hy6/AFi would not exist without the financial support of R&D, sales, marketing and service that are provided by Jenoptik and Leaf. The maker, Franke & Heidecke, no longer has the financial resources and has positioned themselves as a contract manufacturer. Mamiya has had very severe financial losses and it remains to be seen if their late entry into the digital back/camera market can return them to a healthy financial state. The plans of Mamiya's new owner, Cosmos Scientific Systems, Inc., remain unknown. I've left out Pentax, as they are missing-in-action in the medium-format digital business and are in the process of being absorbed by Hoya.

Given the financial reality as it exists now, I would anticipate that in the future medium-format cameras will follow the trend of camera and back being designed, marketed and sold as integrated units. There is simply no financial justification to make a money losing product, unless it supports income from a profitable one.

The business of selling digital backs has not always been profitable either. You may be surprised to discover that Phase One has operated at a loss in many of the past years. The current CEO was appointed in 2001 and given the task of turning the company around. The group of banks and venture capital firms that owned Phase One wanted to groom the company to take public or sell. In 2002, Phase One diversified by becoming a software company with Capture One for Canon, Nikon and many other cameras. After years of losses, in 2003 Phase One turned a small profit. 2004 was considerably better and by 2005, the owners were actively trying to find a buyer when they could show three straight years of profit. No buyer was found and in 2006 the company was sold to four current Phase One managers (75% share) and a danish venture capital firm (25% share).

The problem facing Phase One is not their current financial position, but future direction. As a software company they are going to be hit hard in market share by Adobe and Apple. DxO will take another slice.

In digital backs, Phase One is not providing any financial incentive for a camera maker to provide them with a platform. If I have made anything clear with this lengthy post, I hope it is the business necessity that is now emerging for medium-format camera manufacture to be financially supported by the sale of digital backs. Being offended by this fact, will unfortunately not change it. You can expect that Phase One is now actively searching for a camera to be tied to not just electronically, but financially as well–for their own future prosperity. The days of medium-format cameras and digital backs that are connected electronically, but not financially, is rapidly coming to a close–not because any of these companies are uncaring, evil or have bad intentions, but to survive into the future.
This post from Lula was a well articulated and dispassionate explanation of the economic realities that faced the manufacturers of medium format cameras that did not have their own profit stream from sales of digital backs to subsidize the sale of the cameras and lenses. To say it fell on deaf ears at Phase One is an understatement. However, this economic analysis has nothing to do with why Phase refused to sell the IQ4 backs in the H mount, or its ongoing refusal to open up C1 to Hasselblad files. Phase would have made money by selling IQ4 backs in the H mount and selling C1 software to owners of other medium format systems. Its failure to do so was not borne of economic desperation as was Hasselblad's decision to close the H series camera bodies. Its decisions were motivated by some combination of spite and anticompetitive strategies designed to force photographers to buy Phase digital backs, XF cameras and lenses. In retrospect, management has failed miserably, and the CEO has been fired. I can only imagine the reaction of the Board of Directors in 2016 and later years after Phase acquired Mamiya and spent millions in R&D developing the XF, when Hasselblad released the X series cameras and Fuji released the GFX series and they both racked up huge revenues and profits. Fuji is one thing, but Hasselblad's success is truly poetic justice. Just remarkable how the tables have turned.
 
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There are more subtle things that Phase One could do. The IQ4 / XF were christened the "infinity platform"; it's been pretty finite for the past 3 years. There are number of firmware updates that could have done (and could still do). Lord knows I've submitted many suggestions.

Capture Pilot came to end with IOS 15 or thereabouts (that's when the connectivity problems began). The fix seems simple - their Capture Mobile platform should support IQ3-100 for LV tethering / remote viewing. They could offer an upgrade service to the IQ3 CMOS backs to work with the XT camera and XT lenses (X-Shutter).

These things wouldn't revive PO in terms of new customers, but it would help current customers "keep the faith". Hopefully their new CEO / leadership sees these types of things as an opportunity. But if the "bespoke" photography division is just a side-hustle for Phase One... I don't think the XC cameras and a $20k 150mm XT lens are going to change PO's trajectory.
100%. It would be a small investment in R&D (essentially just some software D, and if it really is a 'platform' it shouldn't be hard to make changes) to really improve trust and confidence with current users.
 

rdeloe

Well-known member
Concerning Phase One, good luck really. Thing is, if your digital back for photography is seen as a side product of your industrial products, then the "photography DNA" of your staff is slowly vanishing and you risk releasing something no photographer asked for in the first place.
That's a very important point.
 
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